The Re-Vision of Rape Law (reviewing \u3ci\u3eReal Rape: How the Legal System Victimizes Women Who Say No\u3c/i\u3e by Susan Estrich) by Scheppele, Kim Lane
REVIEWS
The Re-Vision of Rape Law
Kim Lane Scheppelet
Real Rape: How the Legal System Victimizes Women Who Say No.
Susan Estrich. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1987. Pp.
160. $15.95.
I. Two PICTURES OF RAPE LAW
Does the law take the crime of rape seriously? As is often the
case in legal matters, one can marshall arguments and evidence on
both sides of the issue. One can make a case that the legal system
considers rape a horrible crime and punishes it severely. Or one
can show that the legal system regards charges of rape as trivial or
unreliable, and dismisses them.
Anglo-American law has long considered rape a heinous of-
fense.' Convictions for rape often have brought the most severe
sentences the law can impose. Throughout the history of American
punishment, the death penalty has been carried out more often for
rape than for any other crime except murder.2 Even now, when the
death penalty for rape is unconstitutional,3 life imprisonment for
rape still is held out as the maximum sentence in a number of ju-
risdictions.4 And those who have argued in favor of reduced
sentences for the offense of rape often have done so because they
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Before the Norman Conquest of 1066, the penalty in England for rape was death and
dismemberment. Susan Brownmiller, Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape 24 (1975).
2 U.S. Bureau of Commerce, 1 Historical Statistics of the U.S.: Colonial Times to 1970
at 422 (1975).
3 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597-98 (1977).
' See Leigh Bienen, Rape IV, 6 Women's Rts. L. Rep. 1 (Supp. Summer 1980).
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believe that convictions will be made more likely as a result,5
hardly the goal of those who want to minimize the seriousness of
rape.
A study of rape victims in Boston revealed that the police, not
among those generally expected to take rape cases seriously,
thought rape was a terrible crime indeed.' In fact, a number of
women report sensitive police (particularly where policewomen are
routinely called on rape cases), sympathetic prosecutors, and a
supportive legal system. In a study I worked on with Pauline Bart,
ninety-four women who were raped or attacked and avoided being
raped were asked about their experiences. Some women indicated
that police were very helpful, going so far as to help board up bro-
ken down doors or to tell the victim that she had a right to walk
around unmolested. Some police clearly sympathized with the vic-
tims and were gentle in their questioning. Some of the women re-
ported helpful prosecutors and a generally nonabusive legal
system.7
On this evidence, rape seems a grave matter in the criminal
law. But anyone who has even glanced at the explosion of litera-
ture on the subject in the last fifteen years knows that this is
hardly an uncontested view.
In many cases, the legal system never has a chance to deal
with rape because many victims fail to report their attacks. Only
slightly over half of all rapes and rape attempts by strangers are
reported to the police in the first place,9 and those figures only
count the discrepancies between rapes that women report to the
police and those that women report to survey interviewers. Rapes
reported to neither simply aren't included in the figures. The re-
porting rate for rapes involving acquaintances is harder to calcu-
late because such rapes often are the ones not reported to anyone.
Nevertheless, estimates of the reporting rate vary from 5 to nearly
50 percent, leaving most acquaintance rapes by any account
unreported. 10
I Leigh Bienen, Rape III-National Developments in Rape Reform Legislation, 6
Women's Rts. L. Rep. 170, 179-80 (1980).
1 Linda Lytle Holmstrom and Ann Wolbert Burgess, The Victim of Rape: Institutional
Reactions 44-46 (1978).
Other findings from this study are reported in Kim Lane Scheppele and Pauline B.
Bart, Through Women's Eyes: Defining Danger in the Wake of Sexual Assault, 39 J. Soc.
Issues 63 (No. 2 1983), and in Pauline B. Bart and Patricia O'Brien, Stopping Rape (1986).
8 The explosion of feminist scholarship in this area began with Brownmiller, Against
Our Will (cited in note 1).
9 J. McDermott, Rape Victimization in 26 American Cities 43-48 (1979).
10 Menachem Amir, Patterns in Forcible Rape 27-28 (1971); Brownmiller, Against Our
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Once rapes are reported to the police, a great many complaints
are treated as unfounded, dropped for a whole host of reasons from
the inappropriateness of the jurisdiction to the police not believing
the woman's story. Unfounding rates vary widely, with the national
average being around 10 percent.11 These rates, like the initial re-
ports themselves, vary with the type of relationship between victim
and accused rapist. While less than 5 percent of New York's rape
complaints involving strangers were unfounded, 24 percent of the
nonstranger cases were found to be without merit for
prosecution."2
Even if a rape is reported and a complaint founded, the arrest
statistics in rape cases show that many rapists, particularly those
who did not know their victims, are never apprehended. Washing-
ton, D.C. reported an arrest rate of about 50 percent for all
founded cases. 13 Michigan statistics reveal a fairly steady arrest
rate of between 40 and 50 percent.1 4 The national figures for 1983
reveal a national "clearance by arrest" rate of 52 percent for rape."
At the next stage, decisions to prosecute, there is yet another
attrition of cases. Data from Washington, D.C. indicate that 26
percent of rape cases are not prosecuted once an arrest is made.
The cases are simply dropped. 6 In one county in Texas, prosecu-
tors dropped 42 percent of all cases involving strangers, about 70
percent of cases involving acquaintances, and about 50 percent in-
volving friends.'1 Even when arrests are made, prosecution does
not proceed in a significant number of cases.
If an alleged rapist is caught and the crime prosecuted, he is
Will at 190 (cited in note 1); Diana E. H. Russell, Sexual Exploitation 33-37 (1984).
"' Thomas W. McCahill, Linda G. Meyer, and Arthur M. Fischman, The Aftermath of
Rape 108 (1979).
12 Duncan Chappell and Susan Singer, Rape in New York City: A Study of Material in
the Police Files and its Meaning, in Duncan Chappell, Robley Geis, and Gilbert Geis, eds.,
Forcible Rape: The Crime, The Victim and the Offender 245 (1977).
'" Kristen M. Williams, The Prosecution of Sexual Assaults 24 (Publication No. 7,
PROMISE Research Project, The Instit. for Law & Social Research, Washington, D.C.
1978).
14 Jeanne C. Marsh, Alison Geist, and Nathan Caplan, Rape and the Limits of Law
Reform 31 (1982).
" U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook of Criminal
Justice Statistics 1985 at 435-37 (1986). It should be noted that this is a higher clearance-
by-arrest rate than for any other major crime except murder (76 percent) or aggravated
assault (61 percent). Robbery (26 percent), burglary (15 percent), and car theft (15 percent)
lag far behind rape in the percentage of reports cleared by arrest.
" Williams, The Prosecution of Sexual Assaults at 26 (cited in note 13).
"7 Robert A. Weninger, Factors Affecting the Prosecution of Rape: A Case Study of
Travis County, Texas, 64 Va. L. Rev. 357, 387 (1978).
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not likely to be convicted. In Washington, D.C., the conviction
rate, including plea bargains, was 20 percent. 8 The conviction
rates in other jurisdictions were higher, from 25 percent in New
York City' to 34 percent in California.2 Michigan achieved a very
high conviction rate of around 70 percent following the passage of
a revised rape statute,21 but this figure remains higher than other
jurisdictions. In Philadelphia, where researchers examined the out-
comes of cases noting variables that affected the probability of
conviction, the conviction rate varied from zero in cases where
there was some victim precipitation and no physical roughness or
weapon used by the defendant to about 90 percent where there was
no victim precipitation, a weapon was present, and the victim was
unmarried.22
The attrition rate at every level indicates that rape cases do
not often conclude with conviction of the rapist. One study, figured
from FBI Uniform Crime Reports in 1970, indicated that men who
raped had about a 13 percent chance of being convicted, assuming
that the victim reported the crime to the police.23 Another study
revealed the chances were closer to 2 percent.24 But rape is not
necessarily different from other felonies in this regard because
those actually convicted of felonies generally comprise a minority
of those charged with them.25 Only murder fails to follow this pat-
tern of attrition.26 But the qualitative evidence about the treat-
"8 Williams, The Prosecution of Sexual Assaults at 26. This compares with a 51 percent
conviction rate for murder and a 48 percent conviction rate for burglary.
"' Vera Institute of Justice, Felony Arrests: Their Prosecution and Disposition in New
York City's Courts 8 (1977).
21 Jim Galvin and Kenneth Polk, Attrition in Case Processing: Is Rape Unique?, 20 J.
Res. Crime & Delinquency 126 (1983).
21 Marsh, Geist, and Caplan, Rape and the Limits of Law Reform at 32 (cited in note
14).
22 McCahill, Meyer, and Fischman, The Aftermath of Rape at 191 (cited in note 11).
23 Comment, Rape and Rape Laws: Sexism in Society and Law, 61 Cal. L. Rev. 919,
927 (1973).
2' National Institute for Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Law Enforcement As-
sistance Administration, Forcible Rape, Final Project Report (1978).
25 In one of the most detailed studies of the attrition of felony cases, the Vera Institute
estimated that only 15 percent of those arrested for felonies in New York were convicted of
a felony charge. Only 2.3 percent of the cases went to trial and those that resulted in convic-
tions overwhelmingly convicted the defendant of a misdemeanor or a lesser felony than
charged. The vast majority of cases were either dropped altogether (43 percent) or resulted
in guilty pleas (55 percent). Only 5 percent of these guilty pleas were for the felony charged
and another 20 percent for lesser felonies. About three quarters of all guilty pleas for felony
charges dropped the offense to a misdemeanor. (Figures calculated from table given by Vera
Institute of Justice, Felony Arrests at 7 (cited in note 19)).
26 Id. at 52.
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ment of rape victims indicates that there is more going on here
than ordinary felony attrition.
Rape victims often perceive that the legal system adds to their
injuries; they often tell horror stories about the way they were
treated by police, prosecutors, or defense counsel. In my study
with Bart, we heard that one woman, raped by someone she knew,
called the police and told them her attacker's name and address.
Later the police said they could not do anything in the case unless
she gave them her rapist's social security number, clearly indicat-
ing that the rape wasn't to be taken seriously. In a couple of cases,
police brought suspects to the victims' homes or locked suspected
rapists in the back seat of the police car with the victim on the way
to the station, treating them both like criminals. Victims often re-
ported being upset that their cases were passed on from patrolman
to detective to prosecutor, each of whom asked the same questions
over and over again (sometimes including questions about, for ex-
ample, what the victim had been wearing or whether she enjoyed
sex and often saying directly that they didn't believe her), making
the victims relive the painful experience each time with added hu-
miliation. Some victims got the impression that the police and
prosecutors were, in the words of one victim, "just a bunch of peo-
ple who wanted to hear dirty stories." When a rape case went to
trial, which happened infrequently, several victims reported that
some judges used Hale's dictum, that rape is a charge easily made
and difficult to defend against, in their jury instructions. The pain-
ful treatment victims often have to endure to persist in pressing
charges makes them feel that they are more on trial than the de-
fendant. A study of rape victims in Boston revealed that a number
of victims were challenged by district attorneys almost as if the
DAs were defending the rapist. And when a case came to trial, the
woman's behavior, not the rapist's, was often the focus.27
We have, then, an interesting tension. On one hand, rape is, on
the statute books at least, a serious offense indeed and the regular
(if not very frequent) long sentences meted out to rapists indicates
that this condemnation is not all talk. And some women feel that
the police and prosecutors are on their side in pressing rape
charges, taking their cases as seriously as statutes indicate they
should be. On the other hand, the high attrition rate coupled with
frequently nightmarish experiences of rape victims reveal that it is
very unlikely that rapists will get caught and prosecuted and often
17 Holmstrom and Burgess, The Victim of Rape at 30-260 (cited in note 6).
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true that women will feel their complaints are minimized.
II. REAL RAPE AND SIMPLE RAPE
How can these two very different pictures be reconciled? One
answer to this puzzle is to ask whether both pictures are true, only
in different sorts of cases. Susan Estrich in her book, Real Rape,
adopts just this strategy. "Real rapes," according to Estrich, have
always been treated with grave concern. Real rapes are the ones
where the rapist and the victim are strangers or where the rapist
uses a great deal of physical force or is armed. If there are multiple
rapists or the victim and defendant are of different races (particu-
larly if the victim is white and the defendant is black), these count
as real rapes, too (p. 3).28 The stranger who jumps out from a dark
alley and, brandishing a knife, ambushes his surprised victim, is a
real rapist. And real rapes receive sympathetic attention from po-
lice, prosecutors, juries, and judges. Convictions of real rapists are
upheld on appeal.
"Simple rapes" (pp. 4-5), by contrast, are the ones that have
long been dismissed as trivial in law. Where the rapist knows his
victim, acts alone, and doesn't use a weapon or brutally beat her,
the legal system often treats the rape as if it weren't a rape at all.
These are the cases that police unfound, that prosecutors dismiss
as merely "technical" rapes, where juries fail to convict, and that
judges overturn on appeal.
Estrich's analysis is sophisticated and subtle. It does much
more than provide evidence for and deplore a binary distinction. It
captures the worldview within which such a distinction makes
sense, demonstrates the power of a whole way of seeing relations
between the sexes (particularly as that power is revealed in the
outcomes of appellate court decisions), and shows us all how we
might see differently. The book proposes to reform rape law by re-
visioning it.
The first task in re-visioning is seeing what is there'in the first
place. Estrich reviews American (and a bit of English) case law to
see how the courts have treated cases that have come to them on
appeal. She adopts the view forwarded by the Realists (and com-
plicated by the Critical Legal Studies movement) that doctrine
does not provide single right answers to legal questions but rather
/
28 All parenthetical page references are to Susan Estrich, Real Rape: How the Legal
System Victimizes Women Who Say No (1987). This book is a revision of the article Estrich
published, 95 Yale L. J. 1087 (1986), under the title "Rape."
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provides a set of resources for argument that can be used in a vari-
ety of ways to suit the purposes of the deciding judge (p. 28). Actu-
ally, her analysis shows not that doctrine in rape cases yields un-
predictable results, but rather that a clear, persistent pattern
emerges in which real rapes get serious attention and simple rapes
do not. Whimsy, the incoherence of liberal political thought, politi-
cal party identification, or what the judge had for breakfast, do not
seem to help us understand what's going on here. Instead, Estrich's
impressive analysis reveals the orderly, patterned "situation
sense" 29 of judges and the deep structure of culturally infused per-
ception at work in legal interpretation-perception that persists
even when the statutes judges interpret are reformed.
To capture this perception, Estrich examines the facts that are
highlighted in statutes as compared with the facts that are empha-
sized in opinions. The distinction between real and simple rapes
does not appear in statutes, which in traditional form stipulate
that "[a] man commits rape when he engages in intercourse (in the
old statutes, carnal knowledge) with a woman not his wife; by force
or threat of force; against her will and without her consent" (p. 8).
These statutes draw attention to the defendant's behavior at the
moment of penetration; but Estrich demonstrates that appellate
court decisions often emphasize other facts that highlight the be-
havior of the victim and put the event in the larger context of her
life. Did she know the defendant prior to the incident? Was her
own behavior morally blameless at the time? Did she fight the de-
fendant off with all her strength? The patterned emphasis of these
other facts-facts that assess the actions of the victim as those ac-
tions are set against the backdrop of her life-reveals the structure
of perception embedded in formal law.
In the traditional cases, those brought under the rape statutes
before the reform movement of the 1970s and 1980s, this focus on
the victim was achieved in part through use of the resistance test.
Courts, Estrich demonstrates, used resistance of the victim as an
indicator of the nonconsent that the rape statutes required (pp. 29-
41). They presumed consent unless the victim could demonstrate
that she battled and struggled and fought (and the victim was
more convincing if she fought to the point of injuring herself). In
the absence of this evidence, rape convictions were much harder to
get.
That is, they were much harder to get unless the rapes were
' The term is from Karl Nickerson Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding
Appeals 121 (1960).
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real rapes. Estrich shows that convictions of men who were strang-
ers to the victim, who acted in concert with others, who were
armed, or who were black with white victims, were rarely reversed
for lack of resistance of the victim-even when the victim exer-
cised exactly the degree of resistance that caused courts in simple
rape cases to conclude that the victim had not sufficiently demon-
strated her nonconsent. The resistance test separated simple rapes
from real rapes.
And the same was true of the various evidentiary rules that
embodied distrust of women. The corroboration requirement,
unique to rape cases, operated to throw out most cases of simple
rape where the testimony of the victim was thought to be "inher-
ently incredible" (p. 44). But here, too, one rarely found convic-
tions reversed for lack of corroboration where a real rape was at
issue. Similarly, the introduction of evidence of the victim's prior
sexual history was allowed and was often influential in rape cases,
but primarily where the rape involved acquaintances and where
the defendant might know of the woman's sexual reputation. Con-
victions arising out of violent rapes or gang rapes were rarely re-
versed even when the victim had an active sexual past (pp. 47-53).
The rape law reform movement of the 1970s and 1980s was
supposed to end the second-class treatment of the victims of rape.
State after state enacted new rape statutes, many designed to
refocus attention on the defendant and away from the victim (pp.
57-79).30 Many of these new statutes eliminated the resistance test
and the special evidentiary rules traditionally used in rape cases
because these requirements treated women unfairly.
Estrich examines the case law in the wake of legal reform. The
rape reform movement may have succeeded in changing the stat-
utes, but as Estrich writes, "[t]he problem has never been so much
the terms of the statutes as our understanding of them" (p. 90).
She notes that the old requirements of utmost resistance of the
woman (combined with her chastity and general blamelessness)
have given way to a new statutorily mandated emphasis on the
force used by the rapist (pp. 58-71). This would seem to produce
the sort of shift of focus (off the victim and onto the defendant)
for which feminist law reformers were striving, but in fact the
courts have not interpreted the new statutes this way. Instead, Es-
trich argues, the concern with force has itself become yet another
screen separating real rapes from simple rapes.
30 See also Marsh, Geist, and Caplan, Rape and the Limits of Law Reform at 1-23
(cited in note 14).
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Force, as courts have come to interpret it, is defined by
"'boy's rules' applied to a boy's fight" (p. 60). Force becomes
physical force, the sort of punching, kicking, brawling violence
that is required to get a conventionally socialized man to do some-
thing against his will. But women are socialized differently; in par-
ticular, they often see "force" as involving much more subtle cues.
Women may see force in a man's intimidating posture or veiled
threat, and they may sensibly compare risks of getting hurt with
the chances of escaping someone bigger and stronger. In other
words, a woman may feel the threat of force before any knives are
drawn or punches thrown. And she may give in to that force, en-
gaging in sex against her will, before she has established to the
satisfaction of a court of law that she has "really" not consented.
By limiting the force requirement to physical violence, and partic-
ularly physical violence at the moment of sexual assault, legal doc-
trine omits much of what women perceive as coercion. -
Especially in the case of simple rapes, the substitution of a
standard of physical force for coercion leaves a raped woman, who
has no doubt that she has been forced to have sex against her will,
without voice at law. The woman who says "no" and is ignored
finds that her voice alone was not enough to stop the rapist; and
once the rape has occurred her voice alone is not enough to estab-
lish a crime has happened. To demonstrate force, it is not enough
to cry or plead with a rapist; it is not enough to say "no" forcefully
and frequently. The rape victim who would be heard by the courts
"is one who does not scare easily, one who does not feel vulnerable,
one who is not passive, one who fights back, not cries. The reason-
able woman, it seems, is not a schoolboy 'sissy'; she is a real man"
(p. 68). And a real man, threatened with an assault on his body or
his will, fights back with physical force. In the absence of such
physical force, a woman is held by courts to have consented to sex,
at least when attacked by an acquaintance. When a woman is
ambushed by a stranger, the fact of penetration is generally
enough to establish that sufficient force was used.
Estrich thus discovers that while the wording of rape statutes
has changed, sometimes rather dramatically, and while the number
of convictions reversed on appeal has declined, the courts even now
demonstrate distrust of women who claim rape. And courts reveal
that distrust especially in cases of simple rape. Whatever the legal
test seems to require, the real test is whether the woman put her-
self in what looks in retrospect like a compromising situation. Once
that happens, the law seems to indicate, she's on her own. Rape, all
along, was a heinous offense, when it was deemed to have hap-
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pened. It's just that it was deemed to have happened in many
fewer cases than the victims experienced. And the courts still con-
sistently interpret the factual patterns of simple rapes so as not to
count them as rapes at all. What produces this consistent pattern
of interpretation across many different kinds of rape cases?
III. PERCEPTUAL FAULT LINES
Law cannot live by doctrine alone. Judges tell litigants and
officials what they should do in particular cases. To do this, judges
must do more than interpret the law. They must also interpret the
facts. Estrich reveals that when judges interpret facts in rape
cases, they demonstrate an impressive consistency in sorting out
the things that matter: the facts that distinguish simple rapes from
real rapes are ever-present in court decisions even when the stat-
utes do not stress those facts. In this section, I will explore the
more general process of the interpretation of facts and discuss the
special problems that rape law presents.
A. The Social Construction of Facts
Judges must apply law to facts, interpreting facts and rules
together.3 1 The facts must be made ready for the application of law
just as the law must be made intelligible in light of particular facts.
Legal interpretation is not only performed with legal texts (like
statutes or constitutional clauses); it is also performed with the
seemingly simple statements of what happened. Statements of fact
are just as much constructions of law as are statements of doctrine.
This is not to say that judges lie or that they twist the truth to
fit their prejudices. If lying is the forwarding of "self-disbelieved
statements,"32 then this is certainly not what judges do in normal
practice. But that does not mean that the version of facts that
courts find to be true in particular cases is the right or best or only
truth. The idea of truth is not that simple. There are multiple
"true" descriptions that are not identical with or translatable into
each other. Many different versions of a story all may correspond
with reality, just with different parts of it, rather like the blind
men with the elephant. The goal of law thus cannot be to find the
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. If such an enter-
" For an elaboration of this view, see Kim Lane Scheppele, The Mutual Construction
of Facts and Rules, in Legal Secrets: Equality and Efficiency in the Common Law (forth-
coming 1988, University of Chicago Press).
32 The term is from Erving Goffman, Strategic Interaction 9 (1969).
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prise were possible, it would certainly be largely irrelevant. As Nel-
son Goodman points out:
"The truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth" would
...be a perverse and paralyzing policy.. . . The whole truth
would be too much: it is too vast, variable and clogged with
trivia. The truth alone would be too little, for some right ver-
sions are not true-being either false or neither true nor
false-and even for true versions rightness may matter
more.
33
The interesting question, then, becomes not whether a particular
description of facts is true or false 3 but rather whether a particu-
lar description is the best description among available alternatives.
This may be puzzling. An example from Estrich's book might
help. In one of the cases Estrich discusses, the defendant claimed
that he engaged in heavy caressing. The victim experienced light
choking. 5 As Estrich points out, it may have been that one or the
other was lying. But, as she also notes, it may also have been that
both descriptions were true because men and women have different
perceptions of force. What was heavy caressing to the man may
have been the very same action that counted as light choking to
the woman (pp. 63-64). Each description may have been self-be-
lieved and each description may have reasonably corresponded to
some event in the world, both commonsense standards of what
makes for truth. But the different descriptions have different legal
consequences when the relevant standard in rape law is the force
applied by the defendant to the victim: "light choking" implies a
degree of force absent in "heavy caressing," and choking of any
sort may convince a court that a woman was forced to have sex
against her will. Thus, the description that the court holds to be
"really true" matters a great deal.
How can judges choose among descriptions in a principled
way? On this question, the substantial and blossoming jurispru-
dence of interpretation has surprisingly little to offer.3 And the
13 Nelson Goodman, Ways of Worldmaking 19 (1978).
" Metaphorical descriptions such as "The earth dances the role of Petrouchka" are
compelling, not because they are true or false but because they may give us a picture of the
world that is useful or coherent or insightful. See id. at 109.
35 State v. Rusk, 289 Md. 230, 424 A.2d 720, 722 (1981).
6 For example, Ronald Dworkin excludes questions of fact at the outset in his theory
of interpretation. Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 11-12 (1986). In spite of the interpretive
stance Dworkin takes toward legal texts, he is surprisingly uninterpretive in considering
questions of fact: "If judges disagree over actual, historical events in controversy, we know
what they are disagreeing about and what kind of evidence would put the issue to rest if it
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work of the legal realists, while often concerned with the impor-
tance of facts in the determination of legal disputes, argues either
that "facts are guesses ' '3 7 (implying there is little that can be sys-
tematically said about them) or that the facts that are relevant are
similar to those taken by past courts to be relevant 8 (implying
that the ideas of relevance and similarity themselves have settled
and helpful meanings)., 9
Most often the problem of interpreting facts is taken in legal
practice to be a matter of separating truth from falsehood, and
many of the rules of evidence can be seen as attempts to weed out
unreliable (probably false) facts. But the construction of a state-
ment of facts is not, even in ideal form, the determination of a
single truth, even though the exclusion of lies from legal testimony
and the effort to get the most reliable evidence possible are both
important. Those who construct descriptions of fact are engaged in
a creative enterprise that, like other creative enterprises, operates
within constraints provided both by the genre and by the stan-
dards of evaluation worked out in the discourse of criticism.
We might get some preliminary sense for the genre of legal
fact making and the critical standards that currently cover it by
looking at what courts, in fact, do. In the paradigmatic (but infre-
quent) case of trial by jury, the division of labor between judge and
jury is premised on a problematic distinction between questions of
law and questions of fact.40 A jury resolves questions of fact, using
its own standards about which version of reality to adopt. But, it
does not have to explain what version of reality it adopted nor why
were available." Id. at 3. His discussion of the interpretation of the social practice of cour-
tesy, however, indicates that he is more deeply aware of such interpretive problems than his
other statements suggest. The interpretation of what courtesy is and what it requires in-
volves deep understandings of a society's culture and history, both of which are themselves
matters of some important disagreement and debate. Id. at 47-55, 62-73. Also, Michael
Moore recognizes that "the judge must have some theory about facts that determines which
of the indefinitely large number of descriptions of 'what happened' should be used in decid-
ing the case," but he does not explain what such a theory might be. See A Natural Law
Theory of Interpretation, 58 So. Cal. L. Rev. 277, 283 (1985).
37 Jerome Frank, Facts are Guesses, in Courts on Trial 14 (1949).
" Karl Nickerson Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush: Some Lectures on Law and its Study
47-49 (1930).
39 For a sense of the problematic nature of the idea of relevance, see generally Alfred
Schutz, Reflections on the Problem of Relevance (1970).
40 The difficulty of separating questions of law and fact has now become commonplace
in jurisprudence. See, for example, Edward H. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning 1-9
(1949) for a discussion of the way in which statements of law and statements of fact give
meaning to each other. See also Herman Oliphant, Facts, Opinions and Value Judgments, 10
Tex. L. Rev 127 (1932).
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it decided the way it did. The construction of facts a jury accom-
plishes is left implicit, the standards unstated.
What are we to make of this practice? We might say, first,
that the delegation of fact finding to the jury shows that the selec-
tion of the best version of a story is to be made against the back-
drop of the community's implicit rules for the construction of real-
ity. If this community does not view orders by spirits to be a
reasonable motive for a killing, for example, then a version of real-
ity that incorporates such an account is unlikely to be persuasive
to a jury in a murder trial. If the version of reality that the defend-
ant urges is removed far enough from ordinary narrative conven-
tions that the account is unintelligible to typical community mem-
bers, then the defendant may be found to be insane.41 Even when a
judge composes statements of facts as part of her opinion, the
statements generally follow more broadly accepted conventions of
storytelling."
Most of the time, the implicit standards for the description of
reality work tolerably well. There are large areas of social life
where the commonly understood backdrop is so clear that the rele-
vant description of events is obvious. The question "How was your
day?" asked by a husband of his wife produces answers that make
sense against the backdrop of what they have come to expect from
each other. The wife may reasonably answer that the department
meeting went well or that she'd finished an article she was working
on, but she will probably not say to her husband that she passed
three red cars in a row in the university parking lot.43 The latter
statement would generally be seen as irrelevant in that particular
context. Similarly, the instruction to a guard to shoot any of his
captives who moved does not mean that the guard should then
shoot all the prisoners because they are moving around the earth's
axis and around the sun.44 Some things, while part of a description
of the "whole truth," generally "go without saying." The array of
41 The sociological literature on mental illness, particularly labeling theory, often de-
fines mental illness in terms of deviations from community practice rather than in terms of
disease or some other fixed standard. See generally, e.g., Thomas J. Scheff, ed., Labeling
Madness (1975).
42 The major exception to this general correspondence between legal storytelling and
commensense description is the legal fiction. See Lon Fuller, Legal Fictions (1967); V. K.
Varadachari, Legal Fictions (1979); Pierre J. J. Olivier, Legal Fictions in Practice and Legal
Science (1975); C. K. Ogden, Bentham's Theory of Fictions (1932); Hans Vaihinger, The
Philosophy of "As If" (1924). 1 am in the process of writing a book about legal fictions.
4' See Gaye Tuchman, Making News 6-8 (1978), for a version of this example and a
discussion of it.
14 Goodman, Ways of Worldmaking at 121 (cited in note 33).
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things that could be said as part of a description is so large that we
must have some way of sorting through the huge morass of detail.
And those standards are part of the things that one learns growing
up as a conventionally socialized member of a culture.
In fact, an account, a story, a version of "what happened" only
makes sense against a background that limits the range of things
that might be said. To describe the whole truth is impossible; to
describe a coherent partial truth means having some background
standards for deciding what is relevant and what is not. And judg-
ments of relevance are necessarily local. They depend on things
like the social context and the purposes for which the description
will be used. What is surprising is .how much of social life proceeds
with standards for description being implicit, but well-understood,
highly complex, but used in practice by a great many social
actors.45
B. Social Earthquakes
Agreement over what is true and what has happened does not
extend to all areas of social life, however. Perceptual fault lines run
through social life in locations where the competing visions of dif-
ferently socialized groups come into contact, and, when the pres-
sure is great enough, eventually force the perceptions of one group
or the other to buckle. Although they may coexist for a long time
without serious conflicts, radically different perceptions create the
potential for devastating social earthquakes. The pressures of law-
suits, out of which one version or another emerges victorious, make
such disasters more likely. And two of those areas where radically
different perceptions exist in uneasy tension are in sexual relations
between men and women generally and cases of rape specifically.
This is not to say that rape is simply a matter of variable per-
ception. It isn't. The woman who has been attacked by a stranger,
brutally beaten, violently penetrated has been raped. And every-
one else who hears her story knows she has been raped. Any ver-
sion of the story that leads to a conclusion that this is something
other than rape can be ruled out of bounds. But these are the cases
of real rape, about which the law has generally been non-abusive
from the victim's point of view and for which harsh punishments
11 The project of ethnomethodologists is to uncover these implicit rules and to reveal
their force in social interaction. See generally Harold Garfinkel, Studies in Ethnometh-
odology (1967). Social anthropologists, too, engage in this enterprise. See, e.g., Clifford
Geertz, From the Native's Point of View, in Paul Rabinow and William M. Sullivan, eds.,
Interpretive Social Science 225 (1979).
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have been meted out to convicted rapists. With real rapes, there is
little difference in perception about what happened. That's what
makes them real rapes.
But this is not the case with simple rapes. Where victim and
defendant were previously friendly or where the disputed event oc-
curred while they were dating or in another potentially intimate
setting, perceptions of the victim and defendant about what really
happened may diverge. What seems to be critical in legal judg-
ments is not that the pair knew each other well; a woman volun-
tarily going somewhere with a stranger soon finds herself without a
case of real rape when the man later attacks her (pp. 67-68).46
What seems to matter more is the opportunity for cue swapping, in
which the potential for very different- perceptions emerges. Once
there is a question that the woman could have done something
perceived by the man as a come on, the rape becomes less clear-cut
in law. Again, this is not to say that the woman did not experience
a rape. It's just that in circumstances like this, her definition of
what has happened to her may not accord with the interpretations
others may have of the same event. From what we know about the
different perceptions of women and men, this should not be
surprising.
Social psychological research shows that men often tend to
read sexual intent into women's behavior when that intent is not
there, but women do not seem to do the same with men. Men see
women's friendliness as evidence of seductiveness and promiscuity
when the women themselves think they're merely being polite.47
When given the same cues in a story about a friendship or a dating
context, men are more likely than women to see the relationship as
potentially sexual and to expect more sexual activity to be forth-
coming." Men seem to sexualize their descriptions of women and
of social situations, seeing women as being sexually receptive and
as leading men on even with the most meager evidence.49
46 See, e.g., Goldberg v. State, 41 Md.App. 58, 395 A.2d 1213 (Md. Spec. App. 1970),
and People v. Evans, 85 Misc.2d 1088, 379 N.Y.S.2d 912 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975).
4' Antonia Abbey, Sex Differences in Attributions for Friendly Behavior: Do Males
Misperceive Females' Friendliness?, 42 J. Personality & Soc. Psych. 830 (1982).
48 M. B. Rytting, Sex or Intimacy: Male and Female Versions of Heterosexual Rela-
tionships (paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwestern Psychological Associa-
tion, Chicago, Ill.) (May 1976), cited in Antonia Abbey and Christian Melby, The Effects of
Nonverbal Cues on Gender Differences in Perceptions of Sexual Intent, 15 Sex Roles 283,
283-84 (1986).
19 Abbey and Melby, 15 Sex Roles at 295-97. See also Eugene J. Kanin, Selected Dy-
adic Aspects of Male Sex Aggression, 5 J. Sex Res. 12 (1969). A useful review of a research
on this subject can be found in Sedelle Katz and Mary Ann Mazur, Understanding the Rape
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And these attitudes are not just harmless pictures of the
world, but frames within which men act. A study of a small num-
ber of convicted rapists indicates that they were very confused by
women's signals in social or sexual situations and that they did not
perceive what, to the women, were clear rejections of sexual ad-
vances as negative cues.5 0 After examining a group of studies in
which men have been asked to report their likelihood of raping,
Malamuth reports that about 35 percent of men indicated some
chance that they would rape a woman if they could be assured that
they would not be caught and punished. And those men who re-
ported a higher likelihood of raping women were more accepting of
a series of rape myths, such as the views that women want to be
raped, that they ask for rape by the way they dress and act, that
they are indicating they want to have sex if they invite men to
their apartments or engage in kissing or touching of any sort. 1
Studies of the sexual activity of college students conducted period-
ically since the 1950s indicate that between one-fourth and one-
fifth of college women reported that they have been forced into
sexual activity52 and recent studies show that between one-quarter
and one-third of college men admit to using coercive methods to
force women into sex. 5 3 Men who engage in such coercive sexual
activity are more likely to see women as adversaries and to have a
value system that legitimizes aggression, particularly toward
women.
5 4
The social psychological evidence reveals that, where men and
women have a chance to interact and exchange cues about their
intentions, men are frequently likely to be wrong about what the
woman thinks is going on. Where perceptions diverge in this way, a
woman may experience a rape that a man thought was just the
normal aggression needed to overcome what he saw was the "no"
Victim 143-47 (1979).
50 Jeff Meer, Rapists' Blind Spot, 20 Psych. Today 14 (1986).
51 Neil M. Malamuth, Rape Proclivity Among Males, 37 J. Soc. Issues 138, 140-42
(1981). The questions that indicate acceptance of rape myths are given in Martha R. Burt
and Rochelle Semmel Albin, Rape Myths, Rape Definitions and Probability of Conviction,
11 J. Applied Soc. Psych. 212, 217 (1981).
52 Eugene J. Kanin, Male Aggression in Dating-Courtship Relations, 63 Amer. J. Soci-
ology 197 (1957); Eugene J. Kanin, An Examination of Sexual Aggression as a Response to
Sexual Frustration, 29 J. Marriage & Family 428 (1967); Eugene J. Kanin, Sexually Aggres-
sive College Males, 12 J. College Student Personnel 107 (1971).
'3 Karen Rapaport and Barry R. Burkhart, Personality and Attitudinal Characteristics
of Sexally Coercive College Males, 93 J. Abnormal Psych. 216 (1984); Mary P. Kooss and
Cheryl J. Oros, Sexual Experiences Survey: A Research Instrument Investigating Sexual Ag-
gression and Victimization, 50 J. Consulting & Clinical Psych. 455 (1982).
" Rapaport and Burkhart, 93 J. Abnormal Psych. at 216 (cited in note 53).
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that meant "yes." The social psychological evidence gives us reason
to believe that these perceptual fault lines are deep, enduring, and
of enormous consequence in daily life.
What is the law to do? The situation that confronts courts is
not just the difficult matter of separating truth from falsehood, de-
termining whether someone in the rape case is lying or whether
there is enough evidence to sustain a conviction. Both judges and
juries must face the fact that there often will be conflicting true
versions of the same event and that what is true for one of the
parties may not be true for the other. The only evidence we have
consists of perceptions, whether they are the reports of the victim
and defendant (filtered through the perceptions of judge and jury)
or the ways judges' and juries' first-hand perceptions lead them to
interpret the physical evidence and testimony available."5 There is
no such thing as a value-neutral fact." All facts are made meaning-
ful and "real" against a backdrop of expectations and interpretive
conventions.57 Given the current state of divergent perceptions of
men and women, the more troubling question for law is not the
question of truth and falsehood, but instead the question of which
true version of a particular story should be adopted as the official
version of what happened.
Here, the obvious solutions of farming factual problems out to
juries or putting more women on the bench are unlikely to settle
the question satisfactorily, but not for the obvious reason. One
51 Jerome Frank noted that evidence always comes doubly refracted-once through the
perceptions of witnesses and then again through the perceptions of judges and juries. The
recognition that judges and juries themselves must see through their own perceptual filters
is one of Frank's major insights. But Frank concluded from this observation that "we have
subjectivity piled on subjectivity." Frank, Courts on Trial at 22 (cited in note 37). The fact
that perceptions occur in people's minds does not mean that they are independent of social
influence, that they have no correspondence with the world or that they are outside the
range of normative evaluation. The subjectiveness of perceptions for Frank meant that they
could not be said to be true or that any one was better than any other. And he certainly did
not think that there was any rhyme or reason to them. That was why he believed that the
outcome of lawsuits could never be known in advance. Jerome Frank, Law and the Modern
Mind 183-99 (1930).
"6 There is a large and varied literature on this issue, and one might start in on it by
reading Goodman, Ways of Worldmaking (cited in note 33); Norwood Hanson, Patterns of
Discovery (1958); and for the more adventurous, Hans-George Gadamer, Truth and Method
(1975) and Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (1953).
57 In literary theory, the problem of literal meaning reveals the impossibility of escap-
ing from conventions. Stanley Fish's analysis of a sign that reads "Private Members Only"
shows just how humorous refusing to see the contextually given meaning can be. Stanley
Fish, Normal Circumstances, Literal Language, Direct Speech Acts, the Ordinary, the Eve-
ryday, the Obvious, What Goes without Saying and Other Special Cases, in Is There a Text
in This Class? 268, 275-77 (1980).
1987] IIII
The University of Chicago Law Review
might think that with the evidence presented here, it will be im-
possible for juries composed of men and women ever to agree on
anything or that female judges necessarily will reach different con-
clusions from male judges, destroying whatever coherence exists in
law. But we know from experience, at least with juries, that this is
not so.58 In addition, surveys of the general public indicate that
men and women are not significantly different in many of their
attitudes toward the appropriate legal standards for judging rape.
When asked about whether the degree of a woman's resistance
should be the major factor determining whether a rape has oc-
curred, whether a delay in reporting means a rape probably didn't
happen, and whether convicted rapists should get long sentences,
men and women reveal almost identical attitudes. 9 It is not im-
possible or even difficult to get agreement about the relevant legal
standards against which particular cases should be judged and
there seems to be substantial agreement about the correct legal re-
sult in particular cases. The perceptual fault lines between women
and men do not seem to carry over into the context of law.
And that is exactly the problem. Women and men do have
very different perceptions of experience, but in the context of law
one set of perceptions is hidden. Michel Foucault speaks of subju-
gated knowledges to describe such buried views.60 What re-
mains-the perceptions acknowledged, recognized, seen in law-is
the socially constructed "objective" point of view against which
both men's and women's actions are judged by both men and
58 The famous American jury study by Harry Kalven Jr. and Hans Zeisel found that
only 3 of the 106 rape cases in their study resulted in a hung jury (although we do not know
whether these panels were mixed-sex juries). Harry Kalven Jr. and Hans Zeisel, The Ameri-
can Jury 251 (1966). In a more recent study of jurors in rape trials, no sex differences were
found in the likelihood of voting for conviction. Hubert S. Feild and Leigh B. Bienen, Jurors
and Rape 121 (1980).
'" Feild and Bienen, Jurors and Rape at 50-51 (cited in note 58). Other questions, such
as whether it would do some women good to be raped or whether a woman provokes a rapist
by her appearance, do provoke different responses from women and men, but it is significant
that in most of the questions where the subject is the correct legal standard there is sub-
stantial agreement.
60 "By subjugated knowledges I mean two things: on the one hand, I am referring to
the historical contents that have been buried and disguised in a functionalist coherence or
formal systemization.. . . On the other hand, I believe that by subjugated knowledges one
should understand something else . . . namely, a whole set of knowledges that have been
disqualified as inadequate to their task or insufficiently elaborated: naive knowledges, lo-
cated low down on the hierarchy, beneath the required level of cognition or scientificity."
Michel Foucault, Two Lectures: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-77, in Power!
Knowledge 78,.81-82. (1980).
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women."' That point of view is the law.2 But it is not the point of
view of all63
IV. ENCOURAGING RE-VISION
What is to be done? Estrich identifies a particular point of
view that is embedded in legal doctrine and legal fact finding and I
have shown that this point of view does not reflect women's per-
ceptions and experiences in the world outside of the law. The way
simple rapes are dismissed in law, from police through to appellate
courts, sends a message to women that their experiences are not
real, that their perceptions are not well-founded enough to enter
the law. But the point of view the law embodies is not neutral. As
Estrich writes:
We live in a time of changing sexual mores, and we are likely
to for some time to come. In such times the law can bind us to
the past or help push us into the future. It can continue to
enforce traditional views of male aggressiveness, and female
passivity, continue to uphold the "no means yes" philosophy
as reasonable, continue to exclude the simple rape from its
understanding of force and coercion and nonconsent-until
61 One way women and men try to reconcile their views that particular actions are in-
appropriate with their view that the law ought to incorporate an "objective" point of view is
by distinguishing between moral and legal wrongs, with the former taking into account the
woman's definition of the situation and the latter seeing the situation "technically" or "ob-
jectively." R. Lance Shotland and Lynne Goodstein, Just Because She Doesn't Want To
Doesn't Mean It's Rape: An Experimentally Based Causal Model of the Perception of Rape
in a Dating Situation. 46 Soc. Psych. Quart. 220 (1983). Another way women cope is by
segregating thinking "like a woman" from thinking "like a lawyer" or thinking like some
other representative of a particular style of thinking. Catharine A. MacKinnon, On Excep-
tionality: Women as Women in Law, in Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law
70-77 (1987). See also Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: The Psychological Theory and
Women's Development (1982).
02 When Catharine MacKinnon writes of the point of view that "is the standard for
point-of-viewlessness," she reveals this process of subjugation at work throughout the law.
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: Toward Feminist
Jurisprudence, 8 Signs: J. Women Culture & Soc'y 635, 638 (1983). The attack on the stan-
dards of objectivity in law is a significant part of the agenda of feminist jurisprudence. See
Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 Yale L. J. 1373,
1376-80 (1986).
63 We also see signs that women are trying to escape from this institutional denial of a
female point of view. Estrich begins her book with an account of her own rape (pp. 1-3).
MacKinnon writes of the difficulty women have being women in law. MacKinnon, Feminism
Unmodified at 70 (cited in note 61). And I worried long and hard about whether to write in
this review about my own experience of being sexually assaulted twice, in both cases fighting
off my attackers by responding to physical force with physical force. If writing "objectively"
means writing without experience on this subject, then none of us-male or female-is
"objective."
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change overwhelms us. That is not a neutral course. In taking
it, the law. . not only reflects the views of (a part of) soci-
ety, but legitimates and reinforces those views.
(p. 101).
Feminists who led the drives to change the wording of rape
statutes in the 1970s and early 1980s have completed only part of
the task of altering the operation of rape law. They have re-formed
the statutes by changing the shape of the legal standards, but that
is not enough. Law does not consist solely of rules64 or even of
rules and principles.6 Law consists, as I have argued, of the mu-
tual construction of facts and rules. Changing the legal rules with-
out also changing how courts see the facts is likely to produce only
a minor change of legal course. What is needed still is the re-vision
of rape, learning to see differently in law how men and women
communicate and interact.
This re-vision is at the root of what Estrich proposes. Signifi-
cantly, she proposes changes in definitions of the words used in
rape statutes, changes that alter the facts in the world that the
words point to:
"Consent" should be defined so that no means no. The
"force" or "coercion" that negates consent ought to be defined
to include extortionate threats and misrepresentations of ma-
terial fact. As for intent, unreasonableness as to consent, un-
derstood to mean ignoring a woman's words, should be suffi-
cient for liability. Reasonable men should be held to know
that no means no; and unreasonable mistakes, no matter how
honestly claimed, should not exculpate. Thus, the threshold of
liability-whether phrased in terms of "consent," "force," and
"'coercion" or some combination of the three-should be un-
derstood to include at least those nontraditional rapes where
the woman says no or submits only in response to lies or
threats which would be prohibited were money sought
instead.
(pp. 102-03) (emphasis in original). These changes in definition
bring women's subjugated knowledge into the interpretation of law
and they do so within the purview of legal standards already used
in rape and other criminal cases. Estrich's re-vision indicates that
it is women's saying "no," not men's interpretation of "no," that
H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (1961).
" Ronald Dworkin, The Model of Rules I, in Taking Rights Seriously 14 (1977).
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ought to count as nonconsent in the law. In this new view, "Simple
rape is real rape" (p. 104).
Some might complain that Estrich's standards would catch in
a far-flung net a great many men who were not real rapists. Im-
plicit in that criticism is the traditional view that a man shouldn't
be punished for eagerly pushing an ambiguous social situation too
far. Estrich is not proposing that men guess what is in women's
minds and magically stop a steady progression of advances just
when the women would have them stop. Estrich wants women to
take responsibility for saying no when they mean no, and to say it
forcefully to have it count. She expects only that men should be
able to understand and respect the views that women clearly ex-
press (p. 98).
This is not to say that men now generally understand and re-
spect women's stated views. But the law need not adopt the ver-
sion of facts that reflects current, ordinary social practice. As the
practitioners of law and economics remind us frequently, law is not
necessarily a codification of social practice, it is an incentive sys-
tem. And the existence of legal rules serves to make the approved
behaviors more likely, the disapproved behaviors less likely, other
things being equal. 6 Estrich hopes to create incentives for men to
"open their eyes and use their heads before engaging in sex" (p.
98). By making women's perceptions visible in law, she hopes to
reduce the incidence of simple rapes.
Estrich's proposals are also similar to those of the law and eco-
nomics movement in their sweeping restatement of relevant facts.
Bruce Ackerman has pointed out that one of the major contribu-
tions of law and economics is its broadening of the scope of zele-
vant facts in legal disputes to include a wider field of vision (not
just the who-did-what-to-whom-at-the-moment-of-trouble sorts of
facts, but the sorts of facts that cover broader social practices of
which a particular lawsuit represents one instance).17 Estrich's re-
vision of rape law does the same thing; it attempts to restructure
social practice through restructuring the kinds of facts that courts
notice.
Real Rape is a powerful book. It reveals and empowers
women's experiences in law. If it succeeds in creating a drive for
"For a general statement, see Richard A. Posner, The Economic Analysis of Law at
229-33 (3d ed. 1986). For an analysis more specifically focused on the criminal law, see Gary
S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. Pol. Econ. 169 (1968).
'7 Bruce A. Ackerman, Reconstructing American Law 46-71 (1984).
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the re-vision of rape law, it may enable women to get out from
under the "unfair struggle with the forces of perception. '6 8
" Adrienne Rich, A Vision, in A Wild Patience Has Taken Me This Far 50 (1981).
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